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Abstract 
Trade and Investment Agreements (TIAs) have been widely criticized for their potentially negative 
effects on health. Many governments, particularly from low- and middle-income countries, have 
voiced concerns that mega-regional agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, 
and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, will erode governments’ scope for health 
protection, weakening for instance those options that remain permissible under World Trade 
Organization rules. Further, these mega-regional agreements will set default standards and rules of 
the game that even non-signatories will need to emulate in order to be competitive in the global 
market.  
This article begins by reviewing the changing structure of trade and investment policy, global 
production, and the relation between the two. The effects of trade and investment agreements on 
health are then analyzed, based on some of the most relevant evidence. Key power asymmetries 
within the global trade and investment architecture are described, and the way they influence how 
trade rules are made, implemented and adjudicated.  Section 5 examines a particularly striking and 
topical instance of such power asymmetries, investor-state dispute settlement provisions in TIAs, and 
their relevance to health. The article concludes with recommendations to mitigate the potential 
negative health externalities of TIAs.  
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1. Introduction  
Trade and Investment Agreements (TIAs) have been widely criticised for their potentially negative 
effects on health.1,2,3 Concern is rising in the wake of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, 
signed in February 2016, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) now under 
negotiation between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU).  These ‘mega-regional’ 
agreements are the new wave in trade policy, and if they come into force TPP and TTIP will together 
affect more than half of world trade.4,5 Many governments, particularly from low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs), have voiced concerns that these mega-regional agreements go ‘deeper 
and beyond existing…contractual obligations and disciplines’ found in other trade agreements6 and 
will erode governments’ scope for health protection, weakening for instance those options that 
remain permissible  under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Further, the reach of the mega-
regionals will extend well beyond their signatory countries by setting default standards and rules of 
the game that even non-signatories of these new agreements will need to emulate in order to be 
competitive in the global market.7,8,9 The call from health advocates around the world call for trade 
and investment rules that better reflect health priorities is backed by a growing body of new 
evidence of the ways international trade and investment impact how people work, what they 
consume and how products are made in ways that affect health outcomes.  
The mega-regionals come at a time when trade disputes increasingly centre on the role of health 
protections.10 In 2015 the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade Committee received 
54 specific trade concerns, a record high, and about 1/3rd of these pertain to public health. The 
Barriers to Trade committee notes, “Health protection and labelling, particularly for food and drink, 
are emerging as a dominant theme in many of the ‘specific trade concerns’ that members raise in the 
committee. They highlight the balance governments try to strike between trade and health —
1 Kapczynski A. The Trans-Pacific Partnership — Is It Bad for Your Health? New England Journal of Medicine (373:201-03, 
2015). 
2 Luo J, Kesselheim AS. The trans-pacific partnership agreement and implications for access to essential medicines. (JAMA. 
2015). 
3 Weiss M, Middleton J, Schrecker T. Warning: TTIP could be hazardous to your health. Journal of Public Health (37:367-69, 
2015). 
4 TPP: 26.3%; TTIP: 43.6% (Source: WTO (2014). “WT/TPR/OV/16”, obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, WTO Statistics and UNSD Comtrade database. 
5 Meléndez-Ortiz, R. Mega-regionals: What is Going on? In Global Agenda Council on Trade & Foreign Direct Investment 
(ed.), Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading System? (pp. 13-14). 
(Geneva: World Economic Forum. 2014). Retrieved from: http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2014/14548.pdf. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Jones, E., Deere Birkbeck, C., & Woods, N. Manoeuvring at the Margins: Constraints Faced by Small States in International 
Trade Relations. (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010). 
8  Yu, P. K. TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities. (Fordham International Law Journal, 37, 1129-1182, 2014). 
9 Jones, E. Which Way Forward for the WTO? The Plurilaterals Debate, Background Note. (Oxford: Global Economic 
Governance Programme, University of Oxford, 2014) Retrieved from: 
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/sites/geg/files/WTO%20Plurilaterals%20Background%20Note.pdf. 
10 WTO (2014) Overview of Developments in the International Trading 
Environment – Annual Report by the Director-General – WT/TPR/OV/14, 21 November 2011. 
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reducing obesity, discouraging unhealthy eating and alcohol abuse, protecting children, for example, 
by regulation or by helping consumers to be better informed so they can choose for themselves.” 
(While some countries are concerned to implement fiscal and regulatory measures to protect their 
health, in some cases it has been speculated they argue on health grounds illegitimately in order to 
introduce protections which would favour domestic industries).  
To the extent trade agreements themselves impact on health, they may come into conflict with other 
international agreements, most notably the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and other human rights agreements which provide an obligation to respect, protect 
and fulfill individuals’ right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (the right 
to health) and to take no measures that would negatively affect the right (retrogressive measures). 
This includes not only access to healthcare but also clean water, nutritious food, and a safe work 
environment. Notably, debate surrounding the intellectual property (IP) provisions of the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which may constrain access to 
essential medicines in public health emergencies, has spurred the United Nations Secretary General 
to establish a High Level Panel to ”recommend solutions to remedying the policy incoherence 
between the justifiable rights of inventors, international human rights law, trade rules and public 
health in the context of health technologies that is impeding access and the right to health for 
millions.”11 In 2011, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food recommended that 
“Human rights impact assessments of trade and investment agreements should be prepared prior to 
the conclusion of the agreements and in time to influence the outcomes of the negotiations’, with 
outcomes up to and including ‘amendment’ or ‘termination of the agreement”.12,13 
To address these debates it is first important to understand how trade agreements designed to 
increase trade flows affect public health. It is indisputable that they impact on health outcomes, but 
questions remain as to how and to what degree. In 2001, a widely cited article in the British Medical 
Journal asserted that “globalisation is good for your health, mostly”,14 claiming that increased 
openness to trade leads to more rapid economic growth, with associated opportunities to reduce 
11 UN SG Background paper: Existing and prior work, initiatives and proposals to improve innovation and access to health 
technologies. (2015) Retrieved from: 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/562094dee4b0d00c1a3ef761/t/56da11782b8dde9c3d5865b4/1457132156145/DRA
FT+Background+Paper+on+Existing+and+prior+work+initiatives+and+propo+++.pdf (see summary review of work to date 
UN SG’s High Level Panel on Innovation and Access to Medicines). 
12 De Schutter O. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Addendum: Guiding principles on human rights 
impact assessments of trade and investment agreements. (A/HRC/19/59/Add.5. New York: United Nations, 2011). 
13 Ruckert A, Schramm A, Labonte R, Friel S, Gleeson D, Thow AM Policy Coherence, Health, and the Sustainable 
Development Goals: A Health-Impact Assessment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. (Critical Public Health, published online 
27 April 2016). Retrieved from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09581596.2016.1178379 
14 Feachem, R. G. A. Globalisation is good for your health, mostly. (British Medical Journal, 323, 504-506, 2001). 
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poverty and invest in health care. This claim has since been challenged15, on grounds that it may not 
reduce poverty16 and could increase within-country inequalities.17,18,19 A 2009 Lancet series of papers 
on trade and health identified multiple mechanisms by which trade could harm health, including 
access to pharmaceuticals, dietary changes, and tobacco, alcohol, and other substance use, for both 
better and worse.20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 ,27 ,28 ,29 More recently, the Lancet–University of Oslo Commission 
on Global Governance for Health identified trade and investment agreements as a major source of 
global health inequities.30,31 We believe there is a need to promote further debate on this issue 
among trade scholars.  
In the following section we review the changing structure of trade and investment policy, global 
production, and the relation between the two. In section 3 we apply a simple conceptual framework 
for analyzing the effects of trade and investment agreements on health and summarize some of the 
most relevant evidence.  Section 4 describes key power asymmetries within the global trade and 
investment architecture, and the way they influence how trade rules are made, implemented and 
adjudicated.  Section 5 examines a particularly striking and topical instance of such power 
asymmetries, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in TIAs, and their relevance to 
health. We conclude with recommendations to mitigate the potential negative health externalities of 
TIAs.  
15 Kawachi, I. & Wamala, S. Poverty and Inequality in a Globalizing World. In I. Kawachi & S. Wamala (Eds.), Globalisation 
and Health (pp. 122-137). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
16 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) The Least Developed Countries Report 2013: Growth 
with employment for inclusive and sustainable development. (pp. 24-92). (Paris: UNCTAD Secretariat, 2013). Retrieved from: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ldc2013_en.pdf. 
17 Birdsall, N. The World is Not Flat: Inequality and Injustice in our Global Economy, WIDER Annual Lecture. (Helsinki: World 
Institute for Development Economics Research, 2006). Retrieved from: http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/annual-
lectures/en_GB/AL9/_files/78121127186268214/default/annual-lecture-2005.pdf . 
18 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) Trade and Development Report 2014: Global 
governance and policy space for development. (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2014). Retrieved from: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2014_en.pdf. 
19  Bourguignon, F. The Globalization of Inequality. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
20 Blouin C, Chopra M, van der Hoeven R. Trade and social determinants of health. The Lancet. 2009;373:502-07. 
21 Fidler DP, Drager N, Lee K. Managing the pursuit of health and wealth: the key challenges. The Lancet. 2009;373:325-31. 
22 Lee K, Sridhar D, Patel M. Bridging the divide: global governance of trade and health. The Lancet. 2009;373:416-22. 
23 Smith RD, Correa C, Oh C. Trade, TRIPS, and pharmaceuticals. The Lancet. 2009;373:684-91. 
24 Smith RD, Chanda R, Tangcharoensathien V. Trade in health-related services. The Lancet. 2009;373:593-601. 
25 Smith RD, Lee K, Drager N. Trade and health: an agenda for action. The Lancet. 2009;373:768-73. 
26 Callard, C, Chitanondh, H, Weissman, R. Why Trade and Investment Liberalisation May Threaten Effective Tobacco Control 
Efforts. (Tobacco Control 10:68-70, 2001). 
27 Chanda, R. Trade in Health Services. (Bulletin of the World Health Organization 80(2):158-63, 2002). 
28 Rayner, G, Hawkes, C, Lang, T, Bello, W. Trade Liberalisation and the Diet Transition: A Public Health Response. (Health 
Promotion International 21(1):67-74, 2006). 
29 Thow, AM, Hawkes, C. The Implications of Trade Liberalization for Diet and Health: A Case Study from Central America. 
(Global Health 5(5), 2009). 
30 Ottersen, O. P., Dasgupta, J., Blouin, C., Buss, P., Chongsuvivatwong, V., Frenk, J. et al. The political origins of health 
inequity: prospects for change. (The Lancet, 383, 630-667, 2014). 
31 The present article is prepared by members of the Independent Panel on Global Governance for Health, established to 
follow up the work of the Commission.  
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2. Trade and investment Agreements in the 21st century 
Since the establishment of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs in 1948 (later replaced by the 
World Trade Organization), four major shifts of relevance to health have occurred.  
First, trade increasingly covers not only tangible goods but also services, including finance and 
information. 
Second, trade has come to be dominated by large companies and a complex web of global value 
chains. It is estimated that approximately 80 percent of global trade involves global value chains that 
are controlled by transnational companies (TNCs).32 This change in the geography of global 
production means that trade and investment (or contract production) are increasingly substitutes for 
one another; one way of conceptualizing this change is in terms of a shift from trade in goods to 
trade in tasks.33 
Third, the establishment of the WTO created a powerful, binding dispute settlement procedure in 
which sanctions can be imposed against countries that lose a case and fail to bring their measures 
into conformity with WTO obligations in a reasonable period of time. This means that disputes about 
health may take place not in domestic courts but in the dispute settlement process. 
Fourth, TIAs – which now largely overshadow the deadlocked WTO negotiating process - now 
address not only trade but also investment. They thus intrude significantly on the ‘policy space’ of 
signatory countries: ‘the freedom, scope, and mechanisms that governments have to choose, design, 
and implement public policies to fulfill their aims’.34 
3. How trade agreements impact public health 
The effects of trade liberalization on poverty and inequality must be considered in any analysis of 
health impacts, as demonstrated by a substantial literature on social determinants of health.35,36 
Trade liberalization creates winners and losers. The theoretical economic case for liberalization is 
based on the presumption that losers will be compensated through the redistribution of some 
32 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: 
Investment and Trade for Development. (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2013). 
33 Grossman, G. M. & Rossi-Hansberg, E. The Rise of Offshoring: It's Not Wine for Cloth Anymore (The New Economic 
Geography: Effects and Policy Implications (pp. 59-102). Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2006). Retrieved 
from: http://www.frbkc.org/Publicat/Sympos/2006/PDF/8GrossmanandRossi-Hansberg.pdf. 
34 Koivusalo, M., Schrecker, T., & Labonté, R. Globalization and Policy Space for Health and Social Determinants of Health. 
(R. Labonté, T. Schrecker, C. Packer, & V. Runnels (Eds.), Globalization and Health: Pathways, Evidence and Policy (pp. 105). 
New York: Routledge, 2009) 
35 See e.g. Commission on Social Determinants of Health Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity through Action on 
Social Determinants of Health. (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2008). Retrieved from: 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf. 
36 See e.g. Kelly, M. & Doohan, E. The Social Determinants of Health. (In M. Merson, R. Black and A. Mills (Eds.), Global 
Health: Diseases, Programs, Systems and Policies (pp. 75-114). Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett, 2012). 
                                                          
6 
portion of the aggregate economic gains from expanded trade, but this may or may not actually 
occur. Recent model-based analyses of the anticipated economic effects of the TTIP and TPP find that 
both will lead to a declining labour share of national income and, in some countries, will not promote 
growth at all.37,38 Trade agreements – as the prime instrument for trade liberalization - can impact 
health also in other ways, for better or worse.  Figure 1, based on the analysis of Blouin et al.,39 
provides a heuristic that shows how loss of policy space and loss of government revenue40 can lead 
to negative health outcomes. Apart from possible changes in inequality (just mentioned) our analysis 
focuses on three main ‘distal impacts’ – labour conditions, food, and health care. In the following we 
summarise evidence regarding these three types of health effect, and how TIAs may exacerbate the 
situation.   
 
(Insert Fig 1. about here.) 
 
Food: a number of case studies in Central America, Asia and the Pacific identify increased penetration 
of low- and middle-income country (LMIC) markets by supermarkets, fast food restaurants, and the 
manufacturers and distributors of processed foods after entering into TIAs that reduced barriers to 
imports and investment.41 For example, the removal of trade and investment barriers between the 
US and Mexico was followed by increasing US exports and Mexican consumption of processed meats, 
and declining consumption of grains and pulses.42,43 
A number of studies have attempted to better establish causality based on more rigorous 
econometric analysis. One cross-sectional analysis of 50 low- and middle- income countries found 
that countries with trade agreements with the US have 50 percent higher levels of soft-drink 
consumption per capita than those that do not; higher foreign investment as a proportion of GDP 
37 Capaldo, J. The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: European Disintegration, Unemployment and Instability, 
(GDAE Working Paper No. 14-03. Medford, MA: Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University, 2014). 
Retrieved from: http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/14-03CapaldoTTIP.pdf. 
38 Capaldo, J., Izurieta, A., & Sundaram, J. K. Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality and Other Risks of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement, (GDAE Working Paper No. 16-01. Medford, MA: Global Development and Environment Institute, 
Tufts University, 2016). Retrieved from: http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/16-01Capaldo-IzurietaTPP.pdf. 
39 Blouin, C., Chopra, M., & van der Hoeven, R. Trade and social determinants of health. (The Lancet, 373, 502-507, 2009). 
40 Lost revenue can also be considered a constraint on policy space, by limiting scope and capacity for implementation. 
41 Friel, S., Hattersley, L., & Townsend, R. Trade Policy and Public Health. (Annual Review of Public Health, 36, 325-344, 
2015). 
42 Clark, S. E., Hawkes, C., Murphy, S. M. E., Hansen-Kuhn, K. A., & Wallinga, D. Exporting obesity: US farm and trade policy 
and the transformation of the Mexican consumer food environment. (International Journal of Occupational and 
Environmental Health, 18, 53-64, 2012). 
43 Goran, M. I., Ulijaszek, S. J., & Ventura, E. E. High fructose corn syrup and diabetes prevalence: A global perspective. 
Global Public Health, 8, 55-64, 2013). 
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was also associated with increased levels of processed meat and alcohol consumption.44 In addition, 
a natural experiment in Vietnam identified that annual growth in soft-drink sales per capita increased 
by 8.8 % after joining the World Trade Organisation, which was unmatched with the control country 
the Philippines.45 One study combining individual-level data and an index of globalization found that 
increased economic globalization was also associated with higher body-mass index among women in 
56 low- and middle-income countries, although stronger associations were observed with political 
and social dimensions of the globalization index.46 Given a strong-reliance on time-series analyses 
the evidence of a causal effect of TIAs on consumption of unhealthy processed foods and beverages 
and health precludes definitive conclusions;47 yet, the consistency in these findings suggest that TIAs 
could lead to accelerated nutrition transitions toward unhealthy foods and an accompanying rise of 
overweight and obesity.48,49,50,51,52 
 The provisions within TIAs may also limit the ability of countries to warn of health hazards associated 
with alcohol, tobacco and unhealthy processed foods, and that are effective in discouraging 
consumption.53 Issues related to tobacco are discussed elsewhere in the paper, but a particularly 
relevant concern is that ‘a legal clause in a trade agreement can limit the power of a state to protect 
the public from a product that kills if used in the manner for which it is produced’ which is considered 
a ‘weakness of the system’s protective architecture’.54 For example, Thailand’s restrictions on alcohol 
labelling have been challenged by several countries under the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement.55 Legal clauses limiting such regulations may not only restrict the ability to implement a 
44 Stuckler, D., McKee, M., Ebrahim, S., & Basu, S. Manufacturing Epidemics: The Role of Global Producers in Increased 
Consumption of Unhealthy Commodities Including Processed Foods, Alcohol, and Tobacco. PLoS Med, 9, e1001235, 2012). 
45 Schram, A., Labonte, R., Baker, P., Friel, S., Reeves, A., & Stuckler, D. The role of trade and investment liberalization in the 
sugar-sweetened carbonated beverages market: a natural experiment contrasting Vietnam and the 
Philippines. (Globalization and health, 11(1), 2015). 
46 Goryakin, Y., Lobstein, T., James, W. P. T., & Suhrcke, M. The impact of economic, political and social globalization on 
overweight and obesity in the 56 low and middle income countries. (Social Science & Medicine, 133, 67-76, 2015). 
47 Barlow, P., & Stuckler, D., How do trade agreements affect public health? A systematic literature review and network co-
citation analysis. (manuscript under review) 
48 Popkin, B. M. Global Context of Obesity. (In S. Kumanyika & R. C. Brownson (Eds.), Handbook of Obesity Prevention (pp. 
227-238). New York: Springer US, 2007). Retrieved from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-47860-9_11. 
49 Popkin, B. M., Adair, L. S., & Ng, S. W. Global nutrition transition and the pandemic of obesity in developing countries. 
(Nutrition Reviews, 70, 3-21, 2012). 
50 Hawkes, C., Friel, S., Lobstein, T., & Lang, T. Linking agricultural policies with obesity and noncommunicable diseases: A 
new perspective for a globalising world. (Food Policy, 37, 343-353, 2012). 
51 Monteiro, C. A., Moubarac, J. C., Cannon, G., Ng, S. W., & Popkin, B. Ultra-processed products are becoming dominant in 
the global food system. (Obesity Reviews, 14, 21-28, 2013). 
52 Popkin, B. M. Nutrition, agriculture and the global food system in low and middle income countries. (Food Policy, 47, 91-
96, 2014). 
53 Friel, Sharon, Deborah Gleeson, Anne-Marie Thow, Ronald Labonte, David Stuckler, Adrian Kay and Wendy Snowdon. A 
new generation of trade policy: potential risks to diet-related health from the trans pacific partnership agreement, 
Globalization and Health 2013 9:46. Retrieved from: 
https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-8603-9-46 
54 Friel, S., Hattersley, L., & Townsend, R. Trade Policy and Public Health. (pp.331). (Annual Review of Public Health, 36, 325-
344, 2015). 
55 Ibid. (pp.331-332). 
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set of policies, but may also precipitate ‘regulatory chill’ whereby governments retract, alter or 
reconsider regulations that favour health due to fears that these may fall foul of trade agreements; 
that trade sanctions may be imposed by trading partners; or that decisions taken by relevant dispute 
settlement bodies will force governments to retract particular health policies and laws or pay 
compensation. TIAs can therefore potentially increase access to tobacco and processed food as 
outlined above, whilst simultaneously forsaking opportunities to regulate in ways that could mitigate 
these impacts. 
In a  long-running dispute between the United States and the European Union, the US has levied levy 
duties on imports from the EU in response to the latter’s prohibition on the sale of meat from cattle 
treated with human growth hormone.56 In the EU, the precautionary principle is entrenched in a 
number of laws, covering ‘those specific circumstances where scientific evidence is insufficient, 
inconclusive or uncertain and there are indications through preliminary objective scientific evaluation 
that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the 
environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the chosen level of 
protection’.57 There is little doubt that the precautionary principle is often invoked in ways that aim 
to boost or protect opportunities for local producers and thereby discriminate against foreign 
producers. However, there are cases where the core motivation is indeed to protect and 
environmental or health objectives. It is significant that the European Commission (EC), in 
negotiating TTIP on behalf of EU member countries, is promoting ‘SPS-plus’ provisions that go far 
beyond those in the WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) agreement58,59 
 Employment:  Unemployment can negatively impact psychological and somatic health (Bartley, 
1994; Paul and Moser, 2009), and changes in the types of skills that are demanded as a consequence 
of TIAs may induce short-term unemployment whilst workers find new jobs.60 This can also translate 
into long-term unemployment if workers are unable to retrain, or migrate in order to find new jobs, 
suggesting a potentially critical role for labour market policy.61,62 Although the causal linkages are 
complex, trade liberalization is also associated with increased segmentation of labour markets and 
56 Johnson, R. The U.S.-EU Beef Hormone Dispute No. R40449. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015). 
Retrieved from: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40449.pdf. 
57 Commission of the European Communities Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle  
(COM(2000)1. Brussels: European Commission, 2000). Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf. 
58 See Box 2 
59 European Commission (2013). Trade Cross-cutting disciplines and Institutional provisions: Initial EU position paper. 
Brussels: European Commission. Retrieved from: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151622.pdf. 
60 Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2016). The China shock: Learning from labor market adjustment to large changes 
in trade. Annual Review of Economics, 8(1). 
61 Krugman, P. R., Obstfeld, M., & Melitz, M. (2015). International trade: theory and policy. Prentice Hall. 
62 Barlow, P., & Stuckler, D., How do trade agreements affect public health? A systematic literature review and network co-
citation analysis. (manuscript under review) 
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the rise of precarious employment,63 which has been identified as an important negative influence 
on health.64 When TIAs are ratified between high-income countries with scarce unskilled labour and 
low- and middle-income countries abundant in labour, it may be that TIAs negatively impact on 
health by increasing employment in labor-intensive industries with poor working conditions. Yet, the 
outcome is not clear-cut when considering the possible counterfactual: as unpalatable as the 
situation may be, even low-wage, arduous jobs such as those in Export Processing Zone garment 
factories may represent an improvement on the life chances that would otherwise be unavailable.65 
TIAs can affect labour regulations by changing the political and economic contexts that influence 
policy space. Cross-national comparisons draw unclear conclusions on the effects of trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) on labour standards, with some studies identifying a positive 
correlation between the adoption of core labour standard and increased trade, but not FDI.66,67,68 
Others identify a positive correlation running in the opposite direction whereby reducing labour 
regulations increases FDI but not vice versa.69 Formal recognition of the right to free association and 
collective bargaining (for example) is not necessarily reflected in conditions ‘on the ground’, so these 
findings should be treated with caution. Furthermore, these studies do not capture potential 
‘regulatory chill’ effects. In summary, TIAs may lead to the changes to labour standards we have 
outlined above, whilst also limiting opportunities for mitigating their health effects. 
Health services The provisions within the agreements that affect access to medicines are a good 
illustration of the way TIAs affect health by limiting policy space. Intellectual property rights relating 
to medicines that were established by TRIPS (1994), and moderated by the Doha declaration (2001), 
are now again strengthened though ‘TRIPS plus’, which is included in TIAs such as the TPP. As an 
example of how patents can affect prices, HIV AIDS retrovirals were sold at about $15,000 under 
patent in 2001. Cipla offered them for $350 at that time.  Now they are manufactured by generics 
63 Schrecker, T. (2009). Labor Markets, Equity, and Social Determinants of Health. In R. Labonté, T. Schrecker, C. Packer, & V. 
Runnels (Eds.), Globalization and Health: Pathways, Evidence and Policy (pp. 81-104). New York: Routledge. 
64 Benach, J., Vives, A., Amable, M., Vanroelen, C., Tarafa, G., & Muntaner, C. (2014). Precarious Employment: 
Understanding an Emerging Social Determinant of Health. Annual Review of Public Health, 35, 229-253. 
65 Kabeer, N. & Mahmud, S. (2004). Rags, Riches and Women Workers: Export-oriented Garment Manufacturing in 
Bangladesh. In M. Carr (Ed.), Chains of Fortune: Linking Women Producers and Workers with Global Markets (pp. 133-164). 
London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Retrieved from: http://wiego.org/sites/wiego.org/files/publications/files/Kabeer-
Mahmud-Export-Oriented-Garment-Bangladesh.pdf. 
66 Neumayer, E. & De Soysa, I. (2005). Trade Openness, Foreign Direct Investment and Child Labor. World Development, 33, 
43-63. 
67 Neumayer, E. & De Soysa, I. (2006). Globalization and the Right to Free Association and Collective Bargaining: An 
Empirical Analysis. World Development, 34, 31-49. 
68 Neumayer, E. & De Soysa, I. (2007). Globalisation, Women's Economic Rights and Forced Labour. The World Economy, 30, 
1510-1535. 
69 Olney, W. W. (2013). A race to the bottom? Employment protection and foreign direct investment. Journal of 
International Economics, 91(2), 191-203. 
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companies for $65.70 By virtue of TRIPS ‘flexibilities’, countries are permitted to use compulsory 
licences to make patented drugs more affordable under certain circumstances.71 There is some 
evidence that granting compulsory licenses (CL) can increase access to pharmaceuticals. For example, 
between 2006 and 2008 Thailand granted import licenses for generic equivalents of seven patented 
drugs used in treating cancer and heart disease. Although it is difficult to estimate the number of 
lives saved as a consequences of granting licenses, an extrapolation of trends before the licenses 
were granted compared with actual access rates suggests that an additional 84,158 patients received 
access to the drugs and 12,493 QALYs were gained due to the reforms.72 But In practice, the Thai 
case is exceptional: only a limited number of CLs have been issued. A decade after the 2001 Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and public health affirmed these flexibilities there were ‘few instances’ of CLs 
for diseases other than AIDS, and none ‘for high-impact diseases with patented treatments such as 
malaria, multi-drug resistant tuberculosis, or sepsis’.73 This may be because as of April 2015, five 
percent of the drugs on WHO’s essential medicines list were under patent protection, although this is 
likely to change in future.74 Governments are also presented with the potential challenge of choosing 
between seeking to use TRIPS flexibilities and gaining access to trading partners’ markets. 
Meanwhile, the United States in particular has attempted to negotiate higher levels of intellectual 
property protection - ‘TRIPS-plus’ provisions - in bilateral and regional TIAs, which provide an 
additional barrier to affordable access. The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), for 
example, restricted Guatemalan market access of some generic drugs that are available in the 
US.75,76,77 ‘TRIPS-plus’ provisions are also being promoted by the European Commission and the US in 
TTIP.78    
70 The New York Times, McNeil, Donald G. Indian Company Offers to Supply AIDS Drugs at Low Cost in Africa, February 7, 
2001. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/07/world/indian-company-offers-to-supply-aids-drugs-at-low-
cost-in-africa.html  
71 't Hoen, E., Berger, J., Calmy, A., & Moon, S. (2011). Driving a decade of change: HIV/AIDS, patents and access to 
medicines for all. Journal of the International AIDS Society, 14, 15. 
72 Yamabhai, I., Mohara, A., Tantivess, S., Chaisiri, K., & Teerawattananon, Y. (2011). Government use licenses in Thailand: 
an assessment of the health and economic impacts. Globalization and health, 7(1), 1. 
73 Beall, R. & Kuhn, R. (2012). Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database 
Analysis. PLoS Med, 9, e1001154. 
74 Saez, C. (2015). WHO Reviews Its Essential Medicines List; Some New Candidates Under Patent. Intellectual Property 
Watch [On-line]. Retrieved from: http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/04/21/who-reviews-its-essential-medicines-list-some-
new-candidates-under-patent/ 
75 Roffe, P., Von Braun, J., & Vivas-Eugui, D. (2008). A New Generation of Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements: Lessons 
from the US-CAFTA-DR Agreement. In C. Blouin, N. Drager, & J. Heymann (Eds.), Trade and Health: Seeking Common 
Ground (pp. 41-89). Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 
76 Shaffer, E. R. & Brenner, J. E. (2009). A Trade Agreement's Impact On Access To Generic Drugs. Health Affairs, 28, w957-
w968. 
77 Correa, C. M. (2013). High Costs, Negligible Benefits from Intellectual Property Provisions in FTAs. IIC - International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 44, 902-905. (pp.903-904) 
78 Bloemen, S. & Mellema, T. (2014). Trading Away Access to Medicines - Revisited, Joint Agency Briefing Paper. Oxford: HAI 
Europe and Oxfam International. Retrieved from: http://bit.ly/1x5hJTk. 
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Many TIAs have provisions or chapters on services. For the health community, particular concerns 
have arisen about ‘mode 3’ trade in services (which relates to ‘commercial presence’, e.g. of foreign 
investors in private healthcare facilities or health insurance) and from investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) provisions, discussed in greater detail in section 5, that might entitle investors to 
seek compensation in the event that health services (or health insurance) currently in the private 
sector were taken into the public sector. For example, in the context of the UK’s National Health 
Service (NHS), one analysis expressed concern that expanded involvement of private contractors 
might become “locked in” due to the possibility of compensation claims by investors if alternatives 
are sought.79,80 In the ongoing Trade in Services (TiSA) negotiations, there are efforts to negotiate 
provisions that would limit the scope for signatories to pull back from current and future 
liberalization, and to omit some of the safeguards in the WTO’s existing General Agreement on 
Services (GATS) that permit countries to step back from a given commercial relation, such as by 
revoking a privatization of a previously publicly funded service. These matters are a concern for 
health due to the possible opportunity costs of compensation payments, and because privatization 
may not necessarily translate into higher quality and more equitable health-service provision.81 
In summary, TIAs can have a significant – and potentially negative - impact on health. To better 
understand the political economy of the processes involved, it is necessary to consider how the 
content and scope of TIAs are determined, including the interests they represent. There are 
concerns, for example, that the existing trade policy architecture incorporates a ‘mobilization of bias’ 
in favour of commercial goals and against health-protective regulations which infringe upon these 
aims. We discuss this concept and its implications in the section that follows.    
 
4. Key power asymmetries: What they are and why they matter 
Political scientists continue to debate the nature and sources of power.  However, there is 
widespread agreement that: 
• Power can operate through control of resources (e.g. investment capital or funds needed to 
finance political activity); 
79 Weiss, M. (2015). Trading Health? UK Faculty of Public Health Policy Report on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership. (pp. 94). London: UK Faculty of Public Health. Retrieved from: 
http://www.fph.org.uk/uploads/FPH%20Policy%20report%20on%20the%20Transatlantic%20Trade%20and%20Investment
%20Report%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 
80 See also Reynolds, L. & McKee, M. (2015). Is the NHS really safe from international trade agreements? British Medical 
Journal, doi:10.1136/bmj.h2179. 
81 lbreht, T. (2009). Privatization processes in health care in Europe—a move in the right direction, a ‘trendy’option, or a 
step back?. The European Journal of Public Health, 19(5), 448-450. 
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• Power can operate through the design of institutions that favour certain interests or claims 
relative to others – what has been called the mobilization of bias; 
• Power involves not only visible interactions in which one party prevails over another (e.g. 
elections, court cases) but also situations in which its operation is invisible (e.g. keeping some 
issues off the policy agenda, perhaps because of anticipated reactions) – what have been 
called the two faces of power.82,83 
Trade and investment relations among countries are asymmetrical; and all three of these forms of 
power are manifested in the negotiations concerning TIAs.  Countries vary enormously in terms of 
the size of their markets, and countries with small populations and relatively low GDP may have to 
grant major concessions to larger, richer trading partners in order to secure even modest 
improvements in market access.84,85 This may explain, for example, situations in which LMICs agree 
to provisions such as TRIPs-plus measures in bilateral and regional agreements that are likely to 
increase health inequalities.  This point assumes added importance in today’s trade policy context, 
where action has shifted to plurilateral and regional negotiations and away from the WTO, where 
agreements generally require consensus among all Members and where the prospects for collective 
action by smaller countries to build negotiating power and defend their interests are higher.  Another 
important asymmetry relates to the capacity of countries to assess the full implications of entering 
into TIAs. Here again, the devil is in the details, and the knowledge and expertise required to master 
this very complex field – and to negotiate effectively – is limited in many LMICs,86 and indeed in 
national health departments or ministries in some high-income countries as well.  Within 
government, it has been claimed that ‘most health ministers lack domestic political muscle. They 
might talk tough among themselves, but back home they have to get in line behind colleagues in 
finance, defence, trade, and even education’.87 To the extent that this is the case, it may reflect 
power inequalities or asymmetries that exist not only across national borders, but also within them.  
It has often been observed that business occupies a generically privileged position in market 
economies because of its control over investment.88 In addition, the simple quantum of resources 
available to large corporations often gives them a disproportionate ability to influence public policy, 
to the point where (for example) it has been observed with respect to the US position in the 
82 Lukes, S. (1974). Power: A Radical View. London: Macmillan. 
83 Smith, R. D. (2010). The Role of Economic Power in Influencing the Development of Global Health Governance. Global 
Health Governance, 3. 
84 Stiglitz, J. & Charlton, A. (2004). Common values for the Development Round. World Trade Review, 3, 495-506. 
85 Shadlen, K. C. (2005). Exchanging development for market access?  Deep integration and industrial policy under 
multilateral and regional-bilateral trade agreements. Review of International Political Economy, 12, 750-775. 
86 Jones, E., Deere Birkbeck, C., & Woods, N. (2010). Manoeuvring at the Margins: Constraints Faced by Small States in 
International Trade Relations. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. 
87 The Lancet (2013). What can the UN General Assembly do for global health? The Lancet, 382, 1000. 
88 Lindblom, C. (1977). Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems. New York: Basic Books. P. 170-221 
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negotiations that led to TRIPs that ‘in effect, twelve corporations [in the information and 
pharmaceutical industries] made public law for the world’.89 In a world of globally organised 
production and footloose capital, the power of TNCs is of special significance, not least because the 
best prospects for LMIC economic development often involve integration into global value chains 
(controlled by TNCs) with the hope of moving up those chains to higher-value production, despite 
risks such as exposure to hazardous working conditions and precarious employment relations as the 
price of engagement.90 Faced with the bargaining power of TNCs, governments wishing to attract and 
retain foreign investment must contemplate a variety of compromises on issues ranging from labour 
standards to health protections. TNCs can also replace direct investment with outsourced contract 
production, which reduces their financial risk and enable them to limit costs by playing suppliers off 
one against another. The power that is exercised by strong nations and large corporations has a clear 
influence on how global rules are made, implemented and adjudicated.  
Making the rules: In addition to, and because of, their financial resources and strategic advantages, 
corporate trade lobbyists have much better access to decision-makers than public health and civil 
society actors, at both national and international levels. As an example, during TPP negotiations in 
the United States, private industry and trade groups represented the lion's share of committee 
members - 85% of the total.91 Until the agreed text was published, members of the US Congress, and 
citizens, were denied access except through leaks and rumours. Yu92 suggests that the absence of civil 
society from the negotiations was part of a much broader phenomenon of exclusion.  Similarly, in the 
European Union, the European Commission (EC), the Union’s executive branch, consults regularly 
with representatives of major European-based industry groups,93 through both formal and informal 
channels. The EC’s 14-member Advisory Group of experts established to advise negotiators on the 
TTIP talks includes only one representative from a public health organization, but at least seven from 
various business sectors.94  Major tobacco firms and pharmaceutical companies have often met 
privately and directly with EC officials during TTIP negotiations.95 Although the EC is also required to 
89 Sell, S. K. (2003). Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
90 Abdulsamad, A., Frederick, S., Guinn, A., & Gereffi, G. (2015). Pro-Poor Development and Power Asymmetries in Global 
Value Chains. Durham: Center on Globalization, Governance & Competitiveness, Duke University. Retrieved from: 
http://www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/Pro-PoorDevelopment_and_PowerAsymmetries_inGlobalValueChains_Final.pdf. 
91 Christopher Ingraham & Howard Schneider, Industry Voices Dominate the Trade Advisory System, The Washington Post 
(Feb. 27, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/business/trade-advisory-committees/. Quoted in Eyal 
Benvenisti, Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional Agreements and the Future of Global Public Law, Global Trust 
Working Paper 08/2015 http://globaltrust.tau.ac.il/publications 
92 Yu, P. K. (2014). TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities. Fordham International Law Journal, 37, 1129-1182. 
93 Young AR, and John Peterson. The EU and the New Trade Politics. Journal of European Public Policy. 2006;13:795-814. 
94 European Commission (2014). Expert group to advise European Commission on EU-US trade talks. European Commission 
[On-line]. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-79_en.htm 
95 Gallagher, P. (2015, August 27). TTIP controversy: The European Commission and Big Tobacco accused of cover-up after 
heavily redacted documents released. Independent.  Retrieved from: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
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consult and seek input from civil society groups and the European Parliament’s Committee on 
International Trade, these do not provide health advocates with comparable scope for obtaining 
information and making direct input on negotiations as they unfold.  In an instance of regulatory chill, 
it was revealed in May 2015 that as part of the TTIP process US trade negotiators successfully 
pressured the EU to withdraw proposed regulations on 31 pesticides suspected of damaging 
endocrine functioning.96 Similarly, lobbying by the services industry spurred some governments to 
pursue plurilateral negotiations for an agreement on Trade in Services outside the WTO, thus 
removing even the limited transparency and opportunities for direct public health input available 
through negotiations hosted at the WTO.97 
 Implementing the rules: Once TIAs are signed and ratified, countries - particularly LMICs - face a web 
of diplomatic and economic pressures to speed their implementation and to adopt measures that go 
even beyond the terms of those agreements.98 In the latest round of United States TIAs with LMICs, 
the US ratifies the agreement only after the US government agrees that the country has already 
implemented the agreement satisfactorily – underscoring the intrinsic asymmetries referred to 
above.99 And through monitoring measures such as the annual ‘Special 301’ Watch Lists, the United 
States identifies countries that it considers not sufficiently compliant with US preferences on IP 
protection and enforcement in a diplomatic warning process mandated by legislation but drawing 
directly on industry submissions.100 The U.S. has used threats of trade sanctions and a suite of 
diplomatic pressures as well as technical assistance and training initiatives to dissuade countries from 
tailoring IP legislation to support public health objectives where the U.S has considered this contrary 
to the interests of its industries.101,102,103 
news/ttip-controversy-the-european-commission-and-big-tobacco-accused-of-coverup-after-heavily-redacted-documents-
released-10473601.html 
96 Neslen, A. (2015, May 22). EU dropped pesticide laws due to US pressure over TTIP, documents reveal. Guardian.  
Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/22/eu-dropped-pesticide-laws-due-to-us-pressure-
over-ttip-documents-reveal 
97 Marchetti, J. A. & Roy, M. (2014). The Tisa Initiative: An Overview of Market Access Issues. Journal of World Trade, 38, 
683-728. 
98 Deere, C. (2008). The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property Reform 
in Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
99 Abbott, F. M. (2006). Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements in Light of U.S. Federal 
Law, UNCTAD - ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development Issue Paper No. 12. Geneva: International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Retrieved from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1912621. 
100 Sell, S. K. (2002).  Industry Strategies For Intellectual Property And Trade: The Quest For TRIPS, And Post-TRIPS 
Strategies. Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 79-108. 
101 Deere, C. (2008). The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property Reform 
in Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
102 Morin, J.-F., Daley, K., & Gold, E. R. (2011). Having Faith in IP: Empirical Evidence of IP Conversions. WIPO Journal, 3, 93-
102. 
103 Flynn, S. (2013). US Uses Special 301 To Bully Ukraine, Likely Violating WTO. Techdirt [On-line]. Retrieved from: 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130513/16505323067/us-uses-special-301-to-bully-ukraine-likely-violating-wto.shtml 
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Through diplomatic and economic pressures such as these, the US has also forced some countries to 
abandon the pursuit of compulsory licenses to achieve greater access to essential medicines.104,105 At 
the same time, governments face numerous pressures through international trade negotiations to 
boost IP enforcement, ostensibly to reduce trade in counterfeit goods but which may also sometimes 
serve to limit the availability of legal, safe, generic medicines.106  Many LMIC governments face a 
range of such pressures and find it difficult to navigate several different international processes 
simultaneously, particularly when corporate lobbyists are able to bypass foreign affairs officials and 
go directly to national agencies and legislatures to get laws passed.107  In a recent example, the East 
African Economic Community adopted, as part of its regional cooperative arrangements, stronger 
provisions on IP enforcement than required by TRIPS and other measures to limit counterfeit 
medicines - due to direct lobbying by industry groups of national legislators of Member countries.108 
Adjudicating the rules:  Perhaps the most important mobilization of bias related to TIAs is that 
governments (and in the case of ISDS provisions foreign investors) have standing to claim that their 
interests have been undermined by trade and investment policy decisions.  Parties wishing to argue 
that their health has been adversely affected by the operation of TIAs have no comparable 
opportunities at the international level, although they may in some cases have standing in domestic 
legal fora.  Recent disputes at the WTO have exacerbated concerns that trade rules can be used in 
ways that undermine public health, such as by challenging tobacco control measures like graphic 
health warnings, and the plain packaging of tobacco products, which are being implemented in 
Australia, Ireland and New Zealand.  Whereas industry groups regularly prove successful in 
prompting, and in some cases financing, legal challenges at the WTO, public health advocates 
generally lack either the equivalent influence on trade officials or the resources to help governments 
finance expensive litigation.109  
Several WTO agreements include a general exception for measures ‘necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health. ’ In principle, the WTO’s core agreements on both goods and services, 
for instance, provide that countries can use such exceptions to defend measures that may constitute 
104 Deere, C. (2008). The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property Reform 
in Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
105 Smith, R. D., Correa, C., & Oh, C. (2009). Trade, TRIPS, and pharmaceuticals. The Lancet, 373, 684-691. 
106 Roffe, P. & Seuba, X., eds. (2015). The ACTA and the Plurilateral Enforcement Agenda: Genesis and Aftermath. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
107 Panke, D. (2012). Small states in multilateral negotiations. What have we learned? Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, 25, 387-398. 
108 Spennemann, C. (2014). ACTA, East African Enforcement Legislation and Generic Medicines - A Comparison. In P. Roffe & 
X. Seuba (Eds.), The ACTA and the Plurilateral Enforcement Agenda: Genesis and Aftermath (pp. 244-259). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
109 Eckhardt, J. & De Bièvre, D. (2015). Boomerangs over Lac Léman: Transnational Lobbying and Foreign Venue Shopping in 
WTO Dispute Settlement. World Trade Review, 14, 507-530. 
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a barrier to trade.110  In the early years of WTO jurisprudence, states wishing to defend measures on 
the ground that they are necessary to protect health had to meet a high and unpredictable standard 
of proof,111 and circa 2010, in 40 cases before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body where the State 
raised this defence, in only one dispute did the arbitrators side with the State.112 This dispute 
(Dispute 135: EC-Asbestos) involved the most widely recognised environmental and workplace 
carcinogen - asbestos.  The most common reason for rejecting the validity of the health exception as 
invoked by the defending State was that it could not show the measure was sufficiently ‘necessary’ 
to protect life or health – a determination that raises the issues of competing values guiding the 
choice of a standard of proof, and of the willingness and ability of trade adjudicators to address 
these. For WTO panelists, even if the importance of the health issue at hand is recognized, their task 
is to determine whether the measure is undertaken in ways that respect key WTO principles, such as 
non-discrimination, and whether alternative options exist that would achieve the desired public 
policy goal with less detriment to trade.  A review of proceedings to date, however, reveals that an 
implicit presumption against the validity of health-related defences, and against a precautionary 
approach, appears to be operating.  In the realm of hard politics, in some cases the precedence of 
health that is theoretically accorded by the texts of WTO agreements has been challenged by 
governments themselves.  The Canadian government for many years used WTO procedures, among 
other measures to defend asbestos exports against an EU prohibition.113 And at the WTO, the 
Dominican Republic, Honduras, Cuba, Ukraine and Indonesia, with the support of large multinational 
tobacco companies, have challenged Australia’s regime of plain packaging of tobacco products, 
arguing that these measures violate the TRIPS Agreement and breached articles of the Agreement on 
TBTs.114  This is an instance of a pattern in which ‘internationally active firms do not just instigate 
their home governmental authorities to file a WTO complaint on their behalf, but sometimes also 
push foreign governments to file a WTO complaint against policies of their own home 
government’.115 
5. Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)  
110 Drager, N., Beaglehole, R., Lipson, D., Mirza, Z., Rodríguez Mendoza, M., Wijkstrom, E. et al. (2002). WTO Agreements & 
Public Health: A joint study by the WHO and the WTO Secretariat. Geneva: World Health Organization and World Trade 
Organization. Retrieved from: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/who_wto_e.pdf. P. 30-31 
111 Howse, J. & Caldwell, M. C. (2004). The state of infant health: Is there trouble ahead? In United Health Foundation (Ed.), 
America's Health: State Health Rankings. ( Seattle WA: United Health Foundation. 
112 McGrady, B. (2011). Trade and Public Health: The WTO, Tobacco, Alcohol, and Diet. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. P.130-169. 
113 Sentes, K. E. (2009). Oh, Canada-we stand on guard for asbestos. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 15, 30-49. 
114 Eckhardt, J. & De Bièvre, D. (2015). Boomerangs over Lac Léman: Transnational Lobbying and Foreign Venue Shopping in 
WTO Dispute Settlement. World Trade Review, 14, 507-530. 
115 Ibid. (pp. 508). 
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The power asymmetry between corporate and public health constituencies is especially marked with 
regard to ISDS provisions in TIAs, which allow foreign investors (but not domestic firms or citizens) to 
challenge national laws and policies.  ISDS provisions both reflect and reinforce that power 
asymmetry.  They aim to reduce the risks for foreign investors by providing them with the right to 
seek arbitration in situations where the actions of a host country government have deprived them of 
profits, usually including future or anticipated profits.116  Although originally established with the 
laudable intention of giving foreign investors protections that were not afforded by fragile host 
country legal systems, such provisions now offer foreign investors access to a separate, parallel 
channel of dispute resolution that is not accessible either to domestic entities or to citizens of the 
host country. Such provisions have existed in international agreements since the late 1960s, although 
both the number of agreements incorporating them and the number of cases initiated by investors 
has increased rapidly in recent years (Figure 2). 
(Insert Fig 2. about here) 
The ISDS process is based on a model of arbitration between two equal parties, but the supposedly 
neutral process results in multiple advantages for the investor. Only investors may bring proceedings, 
so states are always the defendants and not able to initiate a claim or file a counterclaim as they 
could in domestic courts. Because TNCs often have a legal presence in multiple countries through 
subsidiaries or affiliates, they can initiate ISDS under whichever investment treaty offers the most 
advantageous provisions (venue shopping). Other protagonists have neither legal standing under the 
relevant TIAs nor the opportunity to engage in this strategy.    
Arbitration most often occurs through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), established in 1966 as part of the World Bank group, though several other 
institutions exist.117 ISDS provisions normally require host States to participate in this arbitration 
process and comply with the arbitration award. The award is binding, with no right to appeal, and 
usually enforceable through domestic court systems,118,119 although a number of practical difficulties 
may exist. Arbitrators often only have the authority to adjudicate a dispute on the basis of the text of 
116 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (2014). Trade and Development Report 2014: Global 
governance and policy space for development. (pp. 137-140). New York and Geneva: United Nations. Retrieved from: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2014_en.pdf. 
117 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N. & Rostert, D. (2014). Investment Treaty Arbitration: Opportunities to reform arbitral rules 
and processes. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainble Development. Retrieved from: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2014/investment_treaty_arbitration.pdf. 
118 Gaukrodger, D. & Gordon, K. (2012). Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy 
Community, OECD Working Papers on International Investment No. 2012/03. Paris: OECD. Retrieved from: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en. 
119 Singh, S. & Sharma, S. (2013). Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The Quest for a Workable Roadmap. 
Merkourios: Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 29, 88-101. 
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the agreement itself, without relying upon other resources or witnesses, and cannot look to a state’s 
other international obligations such as those associated with human rights treaties. In addition, 
arbitrators often have a background in corporate law, and are drawn from a small and tightly close 
knit community120 – effectively, an ‘arbitration industry’ - that is insulated from critiques or legal 
challenges based on conflicts of interest.121,122 The lack of clear and accepted definitions of key terms 
and concepts such as ‘indirect expropriation’ and ‘regulatory taking’123 that are often invoked to 
expand the boundaries of investors’ claims for damages both domestically and internationally  allows 
investors (meaning in practice mainly TNCs) abundant opportunities for policy challenges. Large TNCs 
are not only most likely to be successful in disputes under ISDS provisions, but also have been the 
main beneficiaries in financial terms.124 And not only proceedings but also final decisions may be 
secret: for example, ‘ISDS tribunals rendered at least 43 decisions in 2014, 34 of which are public’.125  
ISDS provisions have been used to challenge a variety of economic, social and health policies.  Such 
challenges have, for instance, addressed restrictions on tobacco packaging; the implementation of a 
minimum wage; and the decision to phase out nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster.126  In 
parallel with the industry-backed government challenges at the WTO, tobacco control measures are 
also under challenge through ISDS. Under the terms of an Australia-Hong Kong bilateral investment 
treaty a US tobacco and cigarette company, Philip Morris, challenged Australia’s plain packaging 
requirement for tobacco products, arguing through a Hong Kong subsidiary that it had lost 
anticipated profits due to this measure. Although in this case unsuccessful,127 such challenges have a 
strong potential dissuasive effect on governments around the world, and reinforce the notion that 
trade and investment principles and rules have, and should have, precedence over health rules. 
120 Olivet, C. & Eberhart, P. (2014). Profiting from Crisis: How corporations and lawyers are scavenging profits from Europe's 
crisis countries. Brussels and Amsterdam: Corporate Europe Observatory and Transnational Institute. Retrieved from: 
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/profiting-from-crisis_0.pdf. 
121 Eberhart, P. & Olivet, C. (2012). Profiting from injustice: How law firms, arbitrators and financiers are fuelling an 
investment arbitration boom. Brussels and Amsterdam: Corporate Europe Observatory and Transnational Institute. 
Retrieved from: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjustice.pdf. 
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Similarly, under an investment agreement between Uruguay and Switzerland, Philip Morris has used 
its Swiss subsidiary to challenge Uruguay’s graphic health warnings for tobacco products.128 These 
examples illustrate the powerful commercial pressures that governments can face, exercised through 
use of the TIA provisions, in their efforts to protect health. 
The TTIP and the TPP, with the text of the latter now released and awaiting ratification by signatory 
countries, each propose the incorporation of ISDS measures. Given the proposed membership of 
these two agreements – 40 countries are involved in the negotiations – and their combined 
contributions to global GDP and share of world trade, the proportion of world trade and investment 
covered by such provisions would increase several-fold.129 Among other consequences, this would 
increase the potential for regulatory chill, which is a special concern for LMIC governments with 
limited resources. ISDS provisions could be used, for example, to challenge minimum unit pricing for 
alcohol, taxes on unhealthy ultra-processed foods, or nutrition labelling.130 Thus, ISDS provisions both 
reflect and entrench power asymmetries with potentially destructive consequences for 
health.  Among the questions understandably raised by critics are: why should foreign investors not 
be required to seek recourse through domestic court systems in countries where they invest?131 And 
where is the justification for not comparably empowering citizens or civil society organizations in 
situations where (for example) foreign investors fail to live up to obligations as defined in 
international law?  In contrast to many other elements of the global trend towards trade and 
investment liberalization, ISDS provisions have drawn criticism from a range of actors including public 
health physicians,132 a number of respected economists;133,134,135 UN special rapporteurs and 
independent experts on human rights;136 and even The Economist magazine.137  
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6. Future directions      
Action is required on several fronts to redress the power asymmetries in the processes of 
negotiating, implementing and adjudicating TIAs so as to better protect the public’s health.  Here we 
present a number of recommendations, most of which require actions by national governments.  
 
1.  Ensure transparency and accountability.  
Transparency and accountability should be improved in all stages: negotiation, implementation and 
adjudication of TIAs. This requires open disclosure of negotiating texts on an ongoing basis, and an 
immediate end to preferential corporate access to negotiating processes. It requires that 
departments of government with responsibilities for health protection be actively engaged in trade 
policy formulation, and that formal mechanisms for prospective health impact assessment of TIAs, 
backed by adequate resources, be put in place.  It also requires opening up dispute resolution 
proceedings, ensuring at the very least that they generate a fully accessible public record.   
 
2.  Protect policy space. 
National governments should avoid making any commitments in TIAs that will limit their ability (or 
the ability of lower levels of government within national borders) to set what they consider 
appropriate standards of health protection; and should seek to renegotiate commitments now in 
place that have such effects. Development assistance and professional and educational exchanges 
should assist in building LMIC governments’ capacity to assess the implications of TIAs for public 
health. Here priority should be given to multilateral approaches that are less likely to reflect the 
biases too often present in bilateral assistance, and also to South-South cooperation and exchange 
among developing countries. 
  
3.  Protect and promote access to essential medicines and health care services.  
Progress toward universal health coverage has become a widely accepted objective in advancing the 
right to health.138,139,140 ,141 Governments should avoid making any commitments that may hinder the 
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achievement of this aim; limit access to essential medicines; or ‘lock in’ past decisions to involve 
private sector actors in health care provision and finance. They should also seek to renegotiate 
commitments now in place that have such effects, and support LMIC government efforts to do so as 
a matter of development policy. 
 
4. End the use of ISDS provisions and pursue a new approach to investment agreements  
Because ISDS provisions tend to entrench and magnify power asymmetries in ways that can be 
destructive of health, governments should make no new commitments to ISDS provisions built on 
existing models, and should seek to renegotiate those in place so as to minimize their infringement 
on national sovereignty and policy space. Recent trends in this direction include modifying 
investment agreements to incorporate exceptions related to sustainable development, or protecting 
regulatory policy space,142 and termination of existing bilateral investment treaties by countries 
including South Africa and Indonesia.143 
 
5.  Permit states’ treaty obligations as arguments in dispute resolution.  
In dispute resolution proceedings, governments should seek to defend measures that would 
otherwise be considered impermissible restrictions on trade and investment on the grounds that 
they reflect obligations under relevant treaties that the government in question has ratified (such as 
the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health or to implement the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco). National governments should seek to incorporate into TIAs provisions that 
protect this defence; should make no commitments that would interfere with the ability to mount 
such defences, and should seek to renegotiate existing commitments that have this effect. Among 
other consequences, implementing this recommendation will immediately enhance the position of 
health ministries and other agencies with a health-related remit in the process of determining 
national positions on trade policy, and provide a new and much-needed window of opportunity for 
civil society.  
 
We end with a more positive and forward-looking recommendation – since current  negotiations and 
preoccupations tend to crowd out space for discussion of viable alternatives.  
6.  Think new. 
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Governments, civil society and multilateral organizations should rethink the purpose of trade and 
trade agreements, so that they foster wellbeing rather than serving to promote and enforce 
investment interests. This can lead to new options for international trade cooperation, including 
cooperation on rules designed to serve a wider set of public policy/health goals, such as agreements 
on technology transfer, research and development investment, and new approaches to financing 
medical innovation.144,145 The adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals146 may offer the 
opportunity for such initiatives. 
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Figure 2: Known ISDS cases, annual and cumulative, 1987-2014147 
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